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Since the Pelješac bridge construction project was awarded to the 
Chinese company China Road and Bridge Cooperation (CRBC) in 
January 2018, the Sino-Croatian relations reached a new high 
point. Since then, and contrary to Croatia’s past activity and 
interest, Croatia not only opted to more actively participate in 
the “17+1” cooperation framework, but even stepped forward 
by hosting the latest “17+1” summit, held in April 2019. The 
rekindled relations have since been, on the surface, bursting with 
possibilities regarding investment, exchanges of personnel, and 
cooperation on various levels. However, years of neglect, especially 
on the Croatian side, had created a situation in which Croatia is 
critically falling behind in experts, Chinese-speaking talents, 
and various aspects of knowledge needed to support this level of 
cooperation. Furthermore, judging by the press releases and the 
lack of clarifications from the Croatian government regarding 
the short-term decisions and the long-term direction the renewed 
Sino-Croatian friendship is taking, general understanding of how 
concepts such as the “17+1” or the Belt and Road Initiative actually 
reflect on Croatia with regards to their influence on the wider 
regional and global circumstances is also lacking. This paper 
analyses the width of the uneven approach China and Croatia 
are taking in the development of their relations and will attempt 
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Introduction
The “16+1”, or the “17+1” cooperation framework as it was 
renamed after the Greek Premier Alexis Tsipras recently 
announced Greece’s wish to join in, and the “Belt and Road 
Initiative” (BRI) are today overlapping political and economic 
concepts the People’s Republic of China has been vigorously 
promoting during the administration of its current president 
Xi Jinping (习近平). While the BRI is designed to provide a global 
multidimensional framework for China to achieve stronger 
connections with Asia, Europe and Africa, the “17+1” concept is 
focused more on strengthening the relations between China 
and the seventeen countries of Europe’s East and Southeast.1 
Although initially started slightly earlier, the “17+1” eventually 
incorporated in the BRI, which has in recent years gained 
significant momentum. Croatia is one of the 17 countries 
selected by China. Its geographical position, long coast with 
several natural harbours, closeness to large European Union 
(EU) economies, multitude of appealing tourist destinations, as 
well as a relative good connectivity within the country does 
make it interesting for China on different levels. 
However, despite all these traits, the potential for stronger ties 
between China and Croatia in recent past was continuously 
failed to be utilized. Although the relations suffered no serious 
incidents, and despite the principled interest from both sides, 
ever since the Croatia gained its independence the overall 
relations between China and Croatia remained still, even cold 
at times. Now, after the “China Road and Bridge Corporation” 
managed to outbid the “western” competition and began 
constructing the large (for Croatia) infrastructure “Pelješac 
bridge” project, the potential has been re-invented and the two 
countries have rekindled communication on a more substantial 
level. Still, despite the revised friendship, years of neglect, 
misunderstanding and discrepancies in political approach to 
their relations, created significant obstacles which threaten to 
jeopardize the further development of their relations. 
In order to determine the dynamic of the relations Croatia and 
China are currently developing, this paper will map the recent 
1 The 17 countries which belong to the “17+1” cooperation framework are: Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
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relations between China and Croatia, analyse and present the 
differences with regards to the development to their relations, 
and will attempt to address some of the problems that have 
been steadily kindling underneath the “friendly relations” 
label. The overall analysis will focus more on the “17+1” 
cooperation framework than on the BRI, keeping in mind the 
complementary nature of both concepts to one another.
The Chinese Side of the “17+1” Cooperation Framework
Ever since the BRI and “17+1” cooperation framework 
were announced in 2013 and 2012, respectively, these two 
concepts have steadily been growing in their importance, 
proportionally affecting not only the spheres of Chinese 
politics and economy, but also significantly influencing trends 
in social and natural sciences as well.2 Trying to catch the wave 
of the development guidelines the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has been introducing lately, many Chinese scientific 
institutions have already begun shifting their focus towards 
Central Asia and Central and Southeast Europe, searching for 
partners that will help them expand their understanding of 
the various political, social and scientific processes unique to 
those areas. In the past couple of years, Chinese institutions 
often used these two concepts, primarily because mentioning 
either significantly increases the chance to access state 
funded projects. Even though most scientists are not truly 
experts on the countries which lay along the “New Silk Road” 
or the Central, East and Southeast Europe, they are being 
stimulated by their Government to make connections and 
gather knowledge. In short, the Chinese Government has, for 
years now, been encouraging various Chinese institutions to 
divert their focus towards the parts of the world China is less 
familiar with. Thus slowly but steadily building a base upon 
which grander things might be built in the future. The 17 
European countries, which include Croatia, do belong to that 
area. The question that follows is what are the results of the 
Chinese “shift in focus” so far, when it comes to the 17 region, 
Croatia and its surroundings? 
2 Literature on BRI is growing by the day. See for example: Plevnik (2016); Musabelliu, M. 
(2017); Nolan, P. (2017); Kobeović, Ž, Kurtela, Ž, Vujičić, S. (2018); The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China: Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, [online] 28 
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a) Institutions
Ever since the “17+1” cooperation framework and BRI were 
introduced, many Chinese institutions began looking toward 
that lesser known parts of Europe. As a result, older institutions, 
such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学
院), Beijing Foreign Studies University (北京外国语大学), Peking 
University (北京大学), and some others, began expanding 
departments that were focused mostly on the area belonging 
to the former Soviet Union and  European socialist countries, 
while many other institutions all around China began 
establishing their own “Central and East Europe” research 
centres of various sizes. Today, it is possible to identify 23 such 
institutions in China.3 The list of institutions is presented in 
the table below.
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3 Due to the size of China and the speed by which the centers, departments and 
institutes which we are about to introduce are opening, it is quite probable that at 
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and East Europe 




Besides the various institutes and research centres mentioned 
above, more than 30 centres which are specialized in research 
of one of the 17 Central, East and Southeast European countries4 
exist in China today. Finally, alongside the growing number of 
institutions within China, China has also established a special 
“China-CEE Institute”, located in Budapest.5
It is worth taking into account that although the number of 
research centres and institutions that focus on the 17 countries 
in various ways is large and growing, most of them have been 
established within the past several years. At this stage, these 
research centres are usually not large and fully functional 
institutions with capabilities to produce large quantity of 
scientific papers, policy proposals, high quality analytical 
results and books, but rather consist of relatively small groups 
of people, most of whom are still in the stage of learning. At this 
moment, China does lack fully trained experts on the 17 area, 
but is also marching on to overturn this shortfall. Although 
still small, these research centres do attract young scholars, 
many of whom will no doubt choose to pursue their PhDs on 
various topics concerning countries from the 17 club and who 
will grow to be top-notch experts in their fields. Furthermore, 
some of these centres have also began programs through which 
young scholars can learn languages of the 17 countries, and 
familiarize themselves with various aspects of their history, 
culture, economy, politics, art, etc., while some universities, such 
as Beijing Foreign Language University or the Capital Normal 
University have already reached the final stage of organizing 
complete BA and MA study programs on “Balkan” or “Central 
and East Europe” area.
4 Information on universities, research centers, and institutes that are specialized in 
researching the 17 area are collected by the Capital Norma University’s professor and 
Center for Study of Civilization’s researcher Li Jianjun. See: Li Jianjun [李建军] (2019).
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Although there is still a long way to go, by spurring various 
research centres, supporting the creation of study programs on 
the 17 countries, educating experts and creating new talents, 
China is slowly but consistently “catching up” with Europe and 
the United States.
b) The Chinese approach to the research of the 16 club6
When we read Chinese scholars’ writings about the BRI and 
“16+1”, we can notice that Chinese scientific community is 
currently in a stage of discovery of the area. The papers that have 
been written discuss various aspects of the development of the 
16 countries, often assessing the region as a whole, and making 
various comparisons between countries inside the 16 region. 
It is obvious from the works of Chinese scholars that economic 
and the political dimensions are of prime importance to them. 
Thus, the majority of papers written on the 16 countries mostly 
include various analysis of the Chinese political approach, 
Chinese investment in the 16 club, or the analysis of China’s 
trade with the selected 16. 
Chinese scholars will, for example, often use the “16+1” high 
level meetings in Warsaw (2012), Bucharest (2013), Belgrade 
(2014), Suzhou (2015), Riga (2016), Budapest (2017) and Sofia 
(2018), as well as many other lower level meetings, as proofs 
of the uninterrupted continuity of the positive development 
in relations between China and the 16 club.7 Quite often, the 
papers will mention that China and the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe have established or are soon planning to 
establish various “16+1 support mechanisms”, presented in the 
table below.
Name (English) Name (Chinese) Location
16+1 Agency for 
Tourism Promotion 





6 Since the introduction of Greece into the “16+1” cooperation framework is relatively 
recent, the papers reviewed for this research do not include Greece. Due to the same 
reason, the phrase “16+1”, and not “17+1” will be used in this part.
7 See: 穆正礼 [Mu Zhengli]，罗红玲 [Luo Hongling]，蓝玉茜 [Nam Yuksai]，魏珮玲 [Wei 
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Name (English) Name (Chinese) Location
16+1 Association 







16+1 Commercial Union 16+1联合商会 Poland and China
16+1 Association of 
Governors
16+1省州长联合会 Czech Republic















16+1 Association for 
Logistics Cooperation
16+1物流合作联合会 Latvia
16+1 Association for 
Forestry Cooperation
16+1林业合作联合会 Slovenia
16+1 Association for 
Health Cooperation
16+1卫生合作联合会
16+1 Association for 
Arts Cooperation
16+1艺术合作联合会
16+1 Association for 
Customs Cooperation 
16+1海关合作联合会
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Name (English) Name (Chinese) Location










* Since not all actual locations of all the institutions have fully been agreed 
upon at the time of writing of this paper, there are a few empty places in the 
“location” column. 
Furthermore, in the works of Chinese authors we can often find 
basic economic analysis which point to the increase of trade 
and investment. For example, total trade volume between 
China and the 16 club increased (roughly from $4.3 billion in 
2001 to $55.1 billion in 2013 and $58.65 billion in 2016), as well 
as that China’s direct investment in the 16 club also increased 
(from about $400 million in 2009 to nearly $1.7 billion in 2014).8 
Aside from the above, Chinese scholars are also quite interested 
in explaining the nature of China’s political approach to the 
selected 16 countries, clarifying first that China, with the BRI, 
helps in “linking different political and economic systems, 
different stages of development, different resources and 
different civilizations of the Eurasian continent,” while with 
the “16+1”,9 which falls under BRI, constructs a “new-type of 
international relations”, which are based on “the principle 
of openness and inclusiveness, mutual benefit and win-win 
cooperation”.10 Looking more precisely at the “16+1” cooperation 
framework, Chinese scholars will further explain that in this 
part of Europe, China practices “multi-layered multilateralism”, 
combining diverse cooperation on a regional level (China - 16 
European countries), sub-regional levels (China - sub regional 
8 穆正礼 [Mu Zhengli]，罗红玲 [Luo Hongling]，蓝玉茜 [Nam Yuksai]，魏珮玲 [Wei Peiling] 
(2017), pp. 872, 875; 刘作奎 [Liu Zuokui] (2016), p. 147; 于军 [Yu Jun] (2015), p. 115; 华红娟  
[Hua Hongjun]，张海燕 [Hai Yangzhan] (2018), p. 31-32.
9 See: 于军 [Yu Jun] (2015), pp. 116-117.
10 See: Liu Zuokui (2017), p. 21. See also 胡勇 [Hu Yong] (2017), p. 7, who used the words of 
the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, stated during the 2nd “16+1” meeting in Bucharest in 
2013, to reach the same conclusion. According to the Chinese Premier, in dealings with 
the Central and East European countries, China will adhere to the three following 
principles: the principle of equality, the principle of mutual benefit and win-win and 
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groups), and on bilateral levels.11 In a practical sense, China’s 
multilateral mechanism building, no matter which part of 
the world it is practiced in, heavily relies on inter-regional 
cooperation, which is strongly based on the principles of 
respect of sovereignty and autonomous voluntary cooperation 
(decision making, planning, coordination, execution) without 
any kind of supranational coordinator.12 The “16+1” cooperation 
framework is no exception. Furthermore, because of various 
differences in development between China and the selected 
16 European countries, as well as because of developmental 
differences among those 16 themselves, the “16+1” cooperation 
framework can also be described as a specific type of south-south 
cooperation with north-south cooperation characteristics.13 
c) Issues? 
Chinese scholars are not oblivious to the issues the “16+1” 
concept brings. Chinese scholars will be the first to admit 
that in the past China focused mostly on developed western 
countries, neglecting the rest - smaller and medium-sized 
developing countries. That tendency has created a large hole 
in China’s understanding of the world, and leaving it without 
the much-needed talent.14 In connection to this one, there is 
also a problem of the attractiveness of these newly discovered 
parts of the world. Chinese students, for example, who wish to 
study abroad, have, until now, always chosen developed western 
countries, and paid little attention to the 16 club. In 2014, there 
were 260,914 Chinese students studying in the United States, 
90,245 in Australia, 86,204 in United Kingdom, 85,226 in Japan, 
42,011 in Canada, 25,388 in France, 21,886 in Germany, and only 
1,615 in the 16 countries altogether. In 2014 there were less 
than five Chinese students studying in Croatia.15 Furthermore, 
Chinese scholars are aware of the EU’s sceptical gaze over China’s 
approach to the EU’s east and southeast, the incompatibility 
of the loans offered by China and the countries’ needs with 
the EU’s financial and legal regulations, the irreparable trade 
asymmetry between China and the 16 countries,16 the fact 
11 See: Presentation given by Song Leilei (2019).
12 See: 张迎红 [Zhang Yinghong] (2017), pp. 15, 17-21.
13 See: 胡勇 [Hu Yong] (2017), pp. 3-5, 8, 14.
14 穆正礼 [Mu Zhengli]，罗红玲 [Luo Hongling]，蓝玉茜 [Nam Yuksai]，魏珮玲 [Wei Peiling] 
(2017), p. 880.
15  See: 孔寒冰 [Kong Hanbing]，韦冲霄 [Wei Chongxiao] (2017), pp. 22.
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that the Chinese Government presents the “16+1” cooperation 
framework and the BRI only in economic and rarely or never 
in political terms, China’s high inability to perceive all of the 
differences between the 16 countries which are now mostly 
unilateral being softly pushed into the new “economic region”,17 
as well as the fact that China still has trouble recognizing the 
countries’ special needs and coordinate those needs with its 
own.18 
Still, no matter the pending issues, we cannot really find 
opinions among Chinese scholars which contradict the main 
line of the Chinese Government regarding the BRI and “16+1” 
in any way. The general feeling of all of the papers, as well as 
newspapers and other popular articles, is that the “16+1” is a 
valid idea which is developing rather smoothly, at its own pace, 
towards the “win-win” balance of relations.
However, in the end, one question still remains, which often 
bothers western scholars and observers quite a lot. If everything 
is going relatively smoothly, why is there a need to put all of 
those diverse countries in one heterogeneous loose economical 
region in the first place? Why is there a need to separate these 17 
countries in any way from the rest of Europe, reminding them 
in the process constantly that they are somehow different from 
“developed” European countries? Why is there a need to push 
this kind of “multi-layered multilateral cooperation framework 
with south-south and north-south characteristics in this part of 
the Europe in the first place? The answer to these questions, for 
now, do not exceed China’s need to address and even somewhat 
simplify the geopolitical approach to the world outside of it.
The Croatian Side of the “17+1” Cooperation Framework 
Ever since Croatia became an independent and sovereign 
country, the relations between China and Croatia developed 
relatively slowly, with only a few individual short-lasting 
initiatives which attempted to surpass the standard classical 
and bleak “friendly” descriptor. China recognized Croatia on 
April 27, 1992, supported Croatian acceptance to the United 
Nations two months later, and on 13 May, 1992 the two countries 
17  See: 孔寒冰 [Kong Hanbing]，韦冲霄 [Wei Chongxiao] (2017), pp. 15-20
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officially established diplomatic relations.19 Croatia’s first two 
presidents, Franjo Tuđman and Stjepan Mesić, took China more 
seriously. Their visits to China in 1993 and 2002, respectively, 
were an attempt to push the diplomatic, cultural and economic 
cooperation to a higher level. Croatia and China’s closest 
moment occurred in May 2005, when in Beijing the Chinese 
and Croatian Premiers, Ivo Sanader and Wen Jiabao (温家宝), 
signed a Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual 
Cooperation.20 However, the relations between these two 
countries soon after hit a standstill, which lasted until the 
announcement of the “Pelješac bridge” construction project by 
the CRBC in January 2018. Despite several promising agreements 
being signed, the visit of China’s President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) 
to Croatia in 2009, as well as the visits of Croatia’s Presidents 
Ivo Josipović and Kolinda Grabar Kitarović to China in 2010 
and 2016, respectively, passed without much significance. 
As Croatian researcher Ivica Bakota notes, Croatia’s focus on 
entering the EU (in 2013), Croatian attempts to discern itself 
from the region, thus “escape” the “Balkan” label, tensions 
between Croatia and Serbia - a country that was at the time 
China’s strongest ally in the region, the lack of experience in 
dealing with Chinese foreign policy initiatives and an overall 
lack of capacity to conduct comprehensive and engaging 
policies toward China were the main reasons for the lower 
activity in relations between the 2010 and 2016.21 Significant 
changes came after Andrej Plenković became the new Croatian 
Premier in late 2016. During his term the bilateral interactions 
between China and Croatia doubled, more focus has been put 
on bilateral cooperation in economy and tourism. Finally, 
after offering better conditions, the CRBC became the main 
contractor for the “Pelješac bridge” construction project, and 
Croatia, for first time ever, expressed an active interest in the 
“16+1” cooperation framework. After Plenković’s visit to China 
in November 2018, it was proposed that the new “16+1” summit 
be held in Croatia.22 Following through on the announcement, 
the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Croatia in April 2019, the 
“16+1” summit was successfully held in Dubrovnik, while China 
and Croatia signed ten new agreements covering agriculture, 
technology, railroad infrastructure, investment and banking.23
19  See: Baković (2005), p. 149; Plevnik, Mesić, Jurčić (2013), p. 228.
20  Plevnik, Mesić, Jurčić (2013), p. 231; Bković (2005), p. 151.
21  See: Bakota (2019), pp. 9-10.
22  See: Bakota (2019), p. 12.
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a) Underneath the surface: the Ministry of Foreign 
affairs and Croatian media
The “Pelješac bridge” construction project, the “16/17+1” summit 
in Dubrovnik, as well as the agreements signed between China 
and Croatia, pushed the Sino-Croatian relations to a new level. 
However, underneath the surface of this newly established 
hype on the Croatian side, we can find substantially large 
potholes in the “infrastructure” needed to sustain this level 
of cooperation. In the first part of this analysis, we have seen 
that the Chinese for years now, by building up the information 
network, gathering knowledge, helping scholars to improve 
their expertise regarding the European Southeast, have been 
preparing themselves to deal with Croatia and the rest of the 
17 countries on a more substantial level. Their political policies 
are being followed by science and education. Croatia, on the 
other side, unfortunately, still shows no signs of such behavior. 
Even if we start from the top, we stumble upon issues and 
inconstancies quickly. In the “Yearly plan of the Croatian 
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs for 2019”, China 
is mentioned only once, in the section which addresses the 
exchange with the countries of Asia and Oceania. Crammed in 
the same box with the Ministry’s plan to arrange a visit to Japan, 
China is mentioned in connection to the “China+16 summit in 
Croatia”.24 The issue is not that China is mentioned only once, 
but that from this single entry to the yearly plan, along with 
no other mention of China in any of the other documents, it 
is impossible to read out Croatia’s long term plan of any kind 
and China Customs which is to ease up the milk export to China, (2) memorandum of 
understanding and (3) cooperation agreement on education and training in industry, 
innovation and technology between the Central State Office for the Development 
of Digital Society and Huawei, (4) financial agreement between the Croatian Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and the Chinese Development Bank, (5) 
cooperation memorandum between the Croatian Railroads Infrastructure and CRBC 
on the cooperation within the Rijeka-Zagreb railroad project, (6) memorandum of 
understanding between the Croatian Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship and 
Crafts and Chinese Ministry of trade on the creation of a joint working group for 
cooperation regarding investment, (7) Memorandum of understanding between the 
Croatian Ministry of Tourism and Chinese Ministries of Culture and Tourism, (8) 
Memorandum of understanding between the Croatian Railroads Infrastructure and 
China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group on joint establishment of the intermodal 
traffic corridor, (9) Memorandum of understanding between the Croatian Ministry 
of Science and Education and Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology on joint 
funding of research projects, (10) Memorandum of understanding between the 
Croatian Central State Office for Sport and Chinese Central Bureau for Sport. See among 
other similar news: Večernji list: Potpisujemo 10 sporazuma s Kinom, [online] 10 April 
2019.
24 See: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Republic of Croatia: Godišnji plan Ministartva 
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regarding China. There are no defined policies, no policy 
proposals, no obvious strategic plans, analysis, no signs of any 
kind of any long term planning whatsoever.
As far as Croatian media reporting on China goes, there are 
also problems, to say the least. There was a lot of coverage of 
the “17+1” summit in Dubrovnik, but very few follow-ups. 
Croatian newspapers still treat news from China, or from the 
Far East in general, as news of secondary importance. There 
is no investigative journalism of any kind that follows any 
topic from that part of the world, no editorials, or opinions. 
Even major news, which are usually copied form CNN or BBC, 
are almost never followed up or developed in any way. There 
are very few exceptions, but only when a direct connection is 
made, such as in the case of Chinese delegation’s visit, which 
the Croatian government was hoping could save the faltered 
“3. Maj shipyard” or the announcement of a new possible 
investment from China.25 However, even news such as these 
are not abundant with succinct information and are usually 
repetitive in nature. 
Unfortunately, signals coming from the Croatian Government 
or Croatian press do not allow us to read out what the official 
or the unofficial position of Croatia toward China or the “17+1” 
cooperation framework actually is. Outside of the simplified 
and much too general adjective “friendly”. The problem is even 
larger when we realize that it is next to impossible to attempt 
to predict where Croatia will stand concerning the “friendship” 
with China in five, ten, twenty or more years.
b) Universities, research centres, think thanks, institutes
The picture painted by Croatian political institutions and media 
is only the reflection of the situation in science and education. 
Besides the Sinology “free study” of the Faculty of Humanities 
and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb, the issues of 
which we will address shortly, not a single Croatian university 
or school, state owned or private, can boast that it can offer its 
students any kind of lectures on China. The Faculty of Political 
Science of the University of Zagreb, where we would attempt 
25 See: Večernji list: Kinezi došli u 3.maj: ‘Reakcije su vrlo pozitivne’, [online] 20 April 2019; 
Poslovni dnevnik: Horvat priznao: Kinezi ne misle ulagati ni u Uljanik ni 3. maj, [online] 21 










XXVI (86) 2020, 
130-154
to search for something like that as a first step, for example, 
has a variety of lectures on the Foreign policy of the United 
States, Political Economy of the EU, Political system of the EU, 
but nothing on China. Today, not a single place exists in Croatia 
where students can learn anything on Chinese foreign affairs, 
politics, economy, political changes, modern society, etc.26
The above mentioned Sinology “free study”, named as such 
because it has for the past fifteen years failed to incorporate 
enough Ph.D. level talents into its ranks to become an accredited 
functional department, is mostly focused only on “classical” 
China and language. For the time being, to sustain itself even 
on the current level, it still uses help from professors from the 
University of Ljubljana for various lectures. However, years of 
neglect and its inability to expand more towards topics that 
deal with modern China have resulted in the Croatian sinology 
free study’s failure to motivate students to finish the study 
course and even attract new students. Generally speaking, for 
years now the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zagreb 
University, together with the Croatian Ministry of Science and 
Education proved to be genuinely uninterested in expanding 
the “Sinology free study” into a fully functional department for 
reasons unknown.27
The analysis of research centres, think thanks or institutions 
which more or less specifically deal with China is even shorter. 
Because besides the privately managed “Geoeconomic Forum”, 
led more or less singlehandedly by dr. Jasna Plevnik, there 
are none.28 Furthermore, aside from a few “memorandums of 
understanding” there are almost no initiatives or firm plans 
to actually fund or form one.
The only institution in Croatia today that deals with China 
consistently is the  Confucius institute at University of Zagreb, 
which far too often serves as a convenient excuse why there 
is no need to upgrade the “Sinology free study”, incorporate a 
lecture or two on China in at least one of Croatia’s universities, 
26 The only exception to this will probably be the privately-owned Zagreb School of 
Economic and Management (ZSEM) which is in the following year preparing to start 
lectures on Chinese Foreign Affairs and General Chinese Studies.
27 Currently the Sinology “free study” is going through a process of reaccreditation. The 
current goal of this reaccreditation is not the creation of an appealing, independent 
and universal study of China, but the fusion of the Sinology with the Japanese studies 
into a new joint study.
28 See: Geoekonomski forum [online]. Available at: http://www.geoeconomic-forum.com/
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or to open a single independent research centre on China and/
or the Far East. The excuse is paradoxical in nature because 
the Confucius institute belongs to a larger Hanban (汉办) 
institution, which itself is a direct extension of the Chinese 
Ministry of Education. Except for Croatian staff, the Confucius 
institute is financed by China. It focuses on language and 
culture, and was never designed to be to be an institution 
for free sharing of knowledge on China or open discussions. 
In short, the Confucius institute’s primary purpose is to 
promote a very specific vision of China, and cannot in any 
circumstances be considered to be the base institution upon 
which independent scientific approach can be envisioned. 
c) Researching China: books, papers, PhDs
Following the lack of institutional direction of the research 
of China or the Far East, it is not surprising to discover that 
independent research regarding China is almost non-existent. 
Croatian knowledge on China is mostly drawn from the 
translations of the world’s bestsellers on China, such as the 
Jaques Gernet’s “Ancient China from the beginnings to the 
Empire”, Edward L. Shaughnessy’s “Ancient China”, Jonathan 
Fenby’s “Modern China”, Frederick William Engdahl’s “Target - 
China”, or Michael Pillsbury’s “The Hundred Year Marathon”, to 
mention only the most important ones.29 Croatians themselves 
write very little. Actually, until today only six books worth 
mentioning on China were written by Croatians. These are 
(1) a large comprehensive, very informative but somewhat 
out-dated overview of Chinese history and culture written by 
Ivo Dragičević: “China: From Heavenly Kingdom until today” 
(2008), (2) memoirs and collections of journalist Dara Janeković 
“Black As and two Doves” (2003), (3) the informative overview of 
Chinese art edited by Dora Baras and Srećko Horvat: Art dossier: 
Kina 1949-2009 (2009), (4) the unfinished book on Chinese 
culture written by the Croatian sinologist Branko Merlin: “The 
Unfulfilled China” (2012), (5) a publication of a first Croatian 
Ph.D. in sinology by Ivana Buljan: “Strategies for Maintaining 
Power: Power and Nature in Chapters 18-21 of the premodern 
29 See: Gernet, J. (2008). Drevna Kina: od prvih početaka do Carstva. Zagreb: Jesenski Turk. 
(Prijevod s francuskog: La Chine ancienne); Shaughnessy, E. L. (2008). Drevna Kina. 
Zagreb: Planeta Marketing Institucional. (Prijevod s engleskog: A Short History of 
Ancient China); Fenby, J. (2008). Povijest suvremene Kine: propast i uzdizanje velike sile, 
1850-2008. Zagreb: Sandorf. (Prijevod s engleskog: History of modern China); Engdahl, F. 
W. (2014). Uništite Kinu: što Washington čini da ograniči utjecaj Kine u svijetu. Zagreb: 
Profil; Pillsbury, M. (2018). Stogodišnji maraton: tajni plan Kine kako da nadmaši 
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Chinese text Luxuriant Gems in Spring and Autumn” (2020), and 
(6) the only noteworthy attempt to analyze the relation between 
Croatia, Croatia’s neighbourhood and China, written by Jasna 
Plevnik, Stjepan Mesić and Ljubo Jurčić: “China on the Balkans” 
(2013). Unfortunately for the last title, it was published just 
moments before the “17+1” and BRI initiatives were launched, 
making it miss the latest political trends.30 
Just as not writing books, Croatians are not writing research 
papers or making analysis of any kind on China either. Besides 
the research papers quoted by this analysis or the several 
papers written by the authors mentioned by this analysis, the 
original works on China is almost impossible to find. Even 
when they are found, they mostly only touch the surface of 
the issues regarding China, never actually attempting to 
start a systematic, long-term and in-depth analysis of some 
phenomenon. Unlike Chinese scholars, the number of which is 
growing steadily, Croatians aren’t trying to define Croatia’s role 
in the “17+1” nor are they trying to assess the plans Chinese have 
with Croatia and it’s neighbourhood, let alone detect the fine 
changes of the balance of power in the region brought on by 
the growing Chinese presence in the region. Similarly to science 
papers, student work is also almost non-existent. Although it is 
possible to find rare exceptions in the form of student papers 
and master thesis, driven usually only by a personal wish to 
acquire knowledge, the lack of lectures on China, high-level 
science papers or experts who could help cultivate new talent, it 
is not surprising to discover that currently not a single Ph.D. on 
China in social sciences and humanities is being done within 
any Croatian institution. 
Croatia’s understanding of China between two poles
The enthusiasm over Chinese advance into the rest of the 
world was described by the Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan 
(王岐山) on 23 January, 2019 during the World Economic Forum 
annual meeting in Davos. After yet another reminder of the 
“5,000 years of uninterrupted Chinese civilization”, China’s 
victimization by foreign aggression, and the CCP’s success 
in liberating the Chinese people and creating a strong and 
independent country, which can boast with a remarkably rapid 
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economic development, the Chinese Vice President eloquently 
explained how China perceives its role in the world. While on 
the one hand, China is a strong adversary to the development 
imbalances, international trade and investment barriers, 
unilateralism, protectionism and populism, on the other 
hand it is also a strong supporter of globalization, “opening-
up across the board, advance international cooperation on the 
Belt and Road Initiative, upgrade an open world economy, and 
work for a new type of international relations featuring mutual 
respect, equity, justice and win-win cooperation under the 
principle of consultation and cooperation for shared benefit.”31 
Furthermore, he reminded the audience that “China remains 
committed to building world peace, promoting global growth 
and upholding the international order,” as well as that all 
mankind should “uphold multilateralism, engage in extensive 
dialogue and cooperation based on mutual respect and mutual 
trust, and jointly build a system of rules for technology and new 
international cooperation framework featuring peace, security, 
democracy, transparency, inclusiveness and mutual benefit, so 
that all people can gain from technological innovation”.32
On the very next day, George Soros, who this time decided 
to focus solely on China, held a speech in a somewhat 
different intonation. Radically different, to be exact. Holding 
no restraints, Soros spoke of “mortal danger facing open 
societies from the instruments of control that machine 
learning and artificial intelligence can put in the hands 
of repressive regimes”.33 He spoke of the dangers of the 
totalitarian control of Xi Jinping’s People’s Republic. In 
short, Soros criticized the practice of the CCP in China to use 
machine learning and artificial intelligence to achieve an 
unprecedented level of control over people and eliminate 
the very idea of the “open society”.34 Furthermore, such 
practices, further supported by Chinese wealth and technical 
capability, as Soros believes, raise a serious question mark 
over China’s level of involvement in the institutions of 
31 See: Xinhua Net: Full text of Chinese vice president’s speech at 2019 WEF annual 
meeting, [online] 24 January 2019.
32 See: Ibid.
33  See: George Soros: Remarks delivered at the World Economic Forum, [online] 24 January 
2019.
34 By the “open society” Soros refers to a “society in which the rule of law prevails as 
opposed to rule by a single individual and where the role of the state is to protect 
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global governance.35 The main focus of Soros’ criticism hits 
the very core of the Wang Qishan’s address, undermining 
the foundations Wang’s concept of “win-win” and “open 
world economy”. In conclusion, Soros advocated for a harder 
crackdown on Chinese main developers of 5G, namely ZTE 
and Huawei, by the United States, because Chinese current 
practices represent a “threat to the freedom of the internet” 
and the “unacceptable security risk for the rest of the world”.36 
As the development of events soon showed, the United States 
followed the path proposed by Soros almost to the letter.37
In this example, which we used only to present how wide the 
stretch is between the different positions on China today, we 
can see that Wang Qishan and Soros represent two directly 
opposed world-views filled by contradicting sets of values. 
The truth for one is the outright threat for the other. The 
truth for the other is exaggeration and the twisting of facts 
for the first. Once we go back to the “17+1” and BRI discussion 
and include Croatia, the questions we can now ask are: 1) 
where between these two poles is Croatia placed? 2) How 
does Croatia sees itself between the China-United States-EU 
political and economic dialogue? 3) Where does Croatia sees 
itself regarding China in the future? 4) How does Croatia plan 
to continue developing its cooperation with Huawei in these 
new circumstances which are surrounding the company? 5) 
Finally, how can Croatia’s (and Slovenia’s) role in the “17+1” 
cooperation framework and the BRI be defined now that Italy 
joined the BRI and offered several ports and a substantial 
infrastructure and investment background with which the 
two smaller neighbouring countries cannot compete?38
Before we show Croatia’s answers to these questions we will first 




37 Meng Wanzhou (孟晚舟), the deputy chairwoman and CFO of Huawei, was arrested in 
Canada in December 2018, before Soros’ speech. Meng Wanzhou’s case was an opening 
incident for the “crack down” on Huawei. Since then, Huawei has been continuously 
pressured by the United States Government and the media. The latest development, one 
which will damage Huawei financially occurred just about two months after Soros’ 
speech. On 19 May, 2019, following Trump’s blacklisting of Huawei, Google “suspended 
business with Huawei that requires the transfer of hardware, software and technical 
services except those publicly available via open source licensing.” See: Reuters: 
Exclusive: Google suspends some business with Huawei after Trump blacklist - source, 
[online] 19 May 2019.
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Conclusions: answers to the questions
From the given analysis, the first conclusion we can draw is 
that at this particular moment there is a concerning difference 
in the intellectual resources China and Croatia are using for 
the support of this level of Sino-Croatian relations. While 
China is steadily building and expanding the base of experts 
and hubs of knowledge on the 17 region and Croatia, Croatia 
is not only not trying to keep up, it is failing even to recognize 
this phenomenon. As we have pointed out, Croatians today are 
not reading about China, there are no lectures where they can 
learn something about China, they are not writing about China. 
Croatians do not know what is going on with China or in China, 
and are almost clueless about what Chinese plans with the 17 
region, which includes Croatia, actually are. To make things 
even more absurd, since Croatian institutions for years have 
been failing to absorb talent educated in China and for dealing 
with China, even the Chinese-speaking Croatians in Croatia are 
ridiculously difficult to find. On the other side, China not only 
cultivates their own talent, but is also, by offering various jobs 
and opportunities, absorbing talent from Croatia.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Chinese centres, 
institutes and research groups mentioned before also function 
as information gathering hubs. They follow and analyse various 
information which come from the “17+1” region with great 
interest. It is also important to understand that the work of 
these centres does not go unnoticed by the more authoritative 
Chinese government institutions such as ministries or large 
state owned media powerhouses. This information is further 
used, if nothing else, for the creation of news or fine adjustment 
to the policies China is developing toward the 17 region. Croatia, 
on the other side, has no mechanism such as that of any kind, 
nor does it have any plans to develop one.
There are a few positive examples, however, we should turn 
to. Besides the already mentioned Geoeconomic forum which 
is trying to push the knowledge about contemporary China 
into Croatian scientific and public opinion spheres, there is 
also the Chinese-Croatian International Research Center for 
Ecology and Nature Protection, established in May 2014. This 
centre was established as a connection point between the 
Jiuzhai Valley National Nature Reserve Management Bureau (









XXVI (86) 2020, 
130-154
of Biology of Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院成都生物
研究所) on the Chinese side, and the University of Zagreb and 
Plitvice Lakes National Park on the Croatian side. The centre 
has since its establishment functioned on a very satisfactory 
level, enabling multiple exchanges, extensive mutual talent 
training, implementation of comparative research, and new 
discoveries.39 Several other projects have also been completed 
successfully in the fields of biology, physics, engineering, 
agriculture, medicine, law, kinesiology, etc., but this Center’s 
results today stand as top examples of successful long-term 
cooperation, and should be looked upon as a model for social 
sciences and humanities. 
However, when everything is taken into account, it is very 
much clear that at the moment China is learning, while 
Croatia isn’t. China is adjusting, while Croatia is standing 
stil l . This phenomenon looks even more troubling if 
we compare Croatia w ith its neighbouring countries. 
Serbia,40 Slovenia,41 Bosnia and Herzegovina,42 Hungary,43 
Austria44 and Italy45 all have a developed, active and fully 
functional sinology or Chinese studies departments which are 
producing high level experts on China year after year. Croatia, 
in comparison, is drastically lagging behind. Therefore, if we 
go back to the five questions we prompted before, the ones 
that address the validity and the geopolitical consequences 
of some of the choices Croatia made in its redefined relations 
with China, as well as those that target the long-term nature 
of that relation, and asked the Croatians’ answer to them, we 
would unfortunately be gravely disappointed. For answers, no 
matter if we try to read them out from Croatia’s political, media 
39 Data available from presentations prepared by prof. Anđelka Plenković-Moraj Faculty 
of Science, Department of Biology, University of Zagreb and prof. Mario Cifrek, Faculty 
of Electrical Engineering and Computing, University of Zagreb. 
40 Sinology department within the Oriental studies of Faculty of Philology of University 
of Belgrade, [online]. Available at: http://www.fil.bg.ac.rs [accessed 1 August 2019].
41 Sinology department of the Ljubljana’s Faculty of Arts, [online]. Available at: http://as.ff.
uni-lj.si/studij/studij/studij_v_tujini_stipendije/sinologija [accessed 1 August 2019].
42 Sinology department of Faculty of Arts at the University of East Sarajevo, [online]. 
Available at: http://ff.ues.rs.ba/index.php/dr/sin-l-gi/dri [accessed 1 August 2019].
43 Chinese Studies within the Oriental studies of the Budapest’s Eötvös Loránd University, 
[online]. Available at: https://www.elte.hu/en/faculties/humanities [accessed 1 August 
2019].
44 Sinology studies within the Department of East-Asian Studies of the University of 
Vienna, [online]. Available at: https://ostasien.univie.ac.at [accessed 1 August 2019].
45 Sinology department of the Language, Culture and Society of Asia and Mediterranean 
Africa studies of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, [online]. Available at: https://www.
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or scientific spheres, are the same. Simple, but dangerous: “we 
don’t know”. 
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